'Aetiology' is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as the study of causation. It is primarily a medical technique, and it has thrown and will continue to throw light on many problems of disease, providing important clues to the understanding of the nature of the disorder and so to advances in diagnosis, treatment and prevention.
An aetiological approach to law asks the question, 'What has caused the law on a given topic to be what it is?' Lawyers rarely concern themselves with this kind of question, and it does not seem to attract much research interest. Yet it can throw a flood of light on many problems, providing a clue not only to why a rule was made, and therefore what was in the mind of the rule-maker, but also to its true meaning. In this process, the spotlight falls on the rule-maker himself.
In fact, the aetiological study of the law resolves itself into a study of the legislators and of the judges who in their different ways create the law in every civilized community.
The fundamental aetiological factor in the law is that it is an artefact from beginning to end, created by human beings and entirely under their control. There is nothing objective or external about it in the sense in which the phenomena of natural science are independent of, or external to, the observer. In theory at least, the law can be changed 'at a stroke' by Parliament and, in fact, it is always undergoing a process of gradual change, analogous to Lammarkian evolution, as it adapts or is adapted to social pressures of various kinds. Parliament itself is subject to these pressures and sometimes responds with legislation which, from an evolutionary point of view, can be regarded as mutagenic. This is the start of legal aetiology.
There is an unresolved paradox here, and consequently chronic conflict. On the one hand, law is regarded as the rock on which civilization dependsthe one unchanging stable thing in a chaotic world, upon which we can all rely. On the other hand, not only can it be changed 'at a stroke', but it sometimes needs to be changed ifit is to retain its influence and respect. Judges are continually exposed to this conflict and each eventually finds his own balance between the pole of stability and the pole offlexibility.
The absence of any external standard of law has troubled jurists and legal philosophers over the centuries, but not, I have to concede, English judges who are essentially pragmatists! In the 17th and 18th centuries, philosophers searched for what they called 'Natural Law', or the 'Law of Nature', to find the legal equivalent of Newton's laws ofmotion, but they were reduced to collecting the rules oflaw which seemed to be common to all known systems oflaw. Nonetheless, the word 'natural' still exerts an almost mystical influence over lawyers. They still speak in tones of reverence of 'natural justice', which implies that there is a higher and better system of justice somewhere 'out there', i.e. in nature. They actually mean no more than fairness. They also often speak of the 'natural and ordinary' meaning of words. The epithet 'natural' adds nothing to 'ordinary', yet judges seem to derive something from it. Perhaps in such a highly artificial environment it does have a subtle emotive appeal.
So judges, particularly in the appellate courts, work in a curious intellectual climate. They are conditioned by tradition and training to the vital importance of respecting 'precedent', that is, the interpretations and definitions ofthe law made by ('laid down by' is the usual phrase) previous judges in similar cases. Yet, like other members of the community, they are exposed to changing social conditions, attitudes, and practices which from time to time make the law seem out-of-date and inappropriate. Like other people too, judges have a sense of the 'justice of the case'; theirs is formed after listening at length to the evidence of both sides. Sometimes, the solution indicated by the precedents appears to be unjust. This produces a very painful conflict in the judge, and can generate much anxiety. Normally, tradition and the doctrine of precedent impose a sufficient discipline to provide support for the individual judge. But, if as quite frequently is the case, the precedents are not clear, or do not quite cover the facts of the instant case, the judge must interpret the earlier rulings in such a way as to apply to the facts of his case. This is a creative exercise, a choice which to a greater or lesser extent moulds that piece of law. This is how judge-made law comes about. The aetiological considerations lie in what made that judge make that choice. Doctors should always remember when judging judges that there is no analogue to the provisional diagnosis. Judges are required to make decisions in the form of 'judgment for the plaintiff or judgment for the defendant'. Compromises are virtually impossible.
Until quite recently, judges tried to ignore these conflicts or, at any rate, spoke as though they were unaware of them or that they were actually deciding something new, but it does not require much phychological insight to discern the conflict underlying the placid prose of their judgments. Indeed, at times, Law Lords have so emphatically repudiated the suggestion that they might be reforming the law that an informed observer might murmur 'Methinks he doth protest too much'. But in our more relaxed or realistic society, some judges do not hesitate to say that the law must keep pace with the times (e.g. Lord Denning in Hewer v. Bryant' and many other cases). Other judges, less bold but sharing his views, feel the constraint of the precedent enough to feel compelled to look for (and find!) something in the older cases which they can use to carry them in the direction they wish to go. They tend to call this 'finding the These are the pressures which provide the motive power for judge-made evolutionary changes. Reinterpretation of the older cases is the mechanism or technique by which changes are brought about. These pressures, of course, operate on different judicial personalities with different effects, depending on upbringing, perception and experience, but there is nearly always (though not always) a surprising degree of consensus. This is where the aetiology of judge-made law is to be found.
In complete contrast to this slow, case-by-case, movement ofjudge-made law, Parliamentary changes by legislation tend to be sweeping and comparatively abrupt. The trouble is, however, that law reform by legislation is unpredictable. The Parliamentary timetable is so overloaded that time can rarely be found for law-reforming, and there is very little party advantage in law reform.
The only systematic study of the aetiology of the processes underlying these changes was made by Professor Dicey, Vinerian Professor of English Law at All Souls. In 1905,he published a series oflectures under the title of the 'Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England in the 19th Century'. He set out to correlate the movements of influential opinion over the period with changes in the law, both by Parliament and by the judges. His conclusions are contained in two passages", one relating to Parliament, the other to the judges. Of Parliament he wrote:
'Law-making in England is the work of men well advanced in life; the politicians who guide the House of Commons, to say nothing of the peers who lead the House of Lords, are few of them below thirty, and most of them are above forty years of age. They have formed or picked up their convictions, and, what is of more consequence, their prepossessions, in early manhood which is the one period of life when men are easily impressed by new ideas. Hence English legislators retain the prejudices or modes of thinking which they acquired in their youth; and when, late in life, they take a share in actual legislation, they legislate in accordance with the doctrines which were current either generally or in the society to which the law-givers belonged in the days of their early manhood. The law-makers, therefore, of 1850may give effect to the opinions of 1830,whilst the legislators of 1880 are likely enough to impress upon the statute book the beliefs of 1860, or rather the ideas which in the one case attracted the young man of 1830,and the other the youth of 1860,'
Of the judges Dicey concluded:
'... we may, at any rate as regards the nineteenth century, lay it down as a rule that judge-made law has, owing to the training and age of our judges, tended at any given moment to represent the conditions of an earlier era than the ideas represented by Parliamentary legislation. If a statute, as already stated, is apt to reproduce the public opinion not so much of today as of yesterday, judge-made law occasionally represents the opinion of the day before yesterday. But this statement must be coupled with the reflection, that beliefs are not necessarily erroneous because they are out of date; there are such things as ancient truths as well as ancient prejudices.' Some of us can only be grateful for that last-minute reprieve! Dicey's finding that prepossessions picked up in early manhood exert their influence throughout life was recently confirmed by a source which would have made him smile. Steve Turner, writing in The Times" about 'baby boomers', i.e those born in the post-war boom and now approaching middle-age, concluded that baby-boomers are still producing changes rooted in the thinking oftheir teenage years. And he quoted Gerard O'Neill of the Henley Centre for Forecasting as saying:
'An idea which helps us a lot in our analysis is that we're all prisoners of youth, that our experiences as teenagers shape our attitude through life. Sometimes this is referred to as the 'Sociology of Nostalgia'. The classic example is the sixties generation.'
Dicey's ideas have certainly helped me to understand the development and evolution of many aspects of the law, and it is fascinating to find them supported by such very contemporary research. The 'sociology of nostalgia' has applications in many other fields than the law. It should contribute to our understanding ofothersocial phenomena and it should encourage some toleration between generations.
My generation of judges belongs to the 1930s, a generation many of the fathers of which had been killed in the First World War, and which grew up in the shadow of the Great Depression. We picked up our prepossessions in an era permeated by Freud. Not that we read or understood his works, but most of the advanced thinkers and radical writers were under his influence. This was the era when sex was openly written about, though still discreetly. Dr Marie Stope's books on 'birth control' (as it was then called) were ceasing to be classified as obscene and were being actively promoted. The sexuality of women was openly, though discreetly, discussed, and sex techniques were being written about. Extramarital sex was spreading to the middle classes, though it still demanded a degree of discretion. A few couples were openly cohabiting. In fact, it was the beginning of the permissive society which was only waiting for reliable contraceptives and antibiotics to take off.
It was also the era of psychology, which was introducing concepts like 'maternal fixation', 'inferiority complex', 'Oedipus situation' and 'repression', which seemed to explain, and take the guilt out of, much behaviour, previously regarded, unreservedly, as bad, immoral or degrading. One of the consequences was to deprive us of the confidence to make those harsh moral judgments which seemed to come so easily to our immediate predecessors.
It is not, therefore, a coincidence that the judges appointed in the 1960s (i.e, at about 50 years of age and therefore of the 1930's generation) took a much more liberal view of matrimonial misbehaviour than their older colleagues and so relaxed many aspects of divorce law before Parliament later intervened", Similarly, sentencing policy for criminal offences became more lenient and hopefully therapeutic, but later generations have reacted against this tendency.
I cannot identify with confidence the prepossessions of younger men and women but, assuming that Dicey is right, Mrs Thatcher and most of her colleagues picked up their prepossessions in the late 1940sand early 1950s,and Ken Livingstone his in the 1960s! The hypothesis seems to be holding! As will be seen later, the decade of the 1960s was a period of striking liberalization of the law in many different directions. It was the era in which Parliament abolished the death penalty for murder, introduced the defence of diminished responsibility, legalized homosexual activity between consenting male adults in private, relaxed the law about abortion and radically changed the divorce law.
Dicey's hypothesis points to the late 1930s and early 1940s, i.e. the period of the Second World War. In contrast, it is doubtful whether those bills would have gone through the Parliaments of the 1970s or 1980s.
Against that background I will now look more closely at some of the areas oflaw which particularly affect the medical profession and in which other aetiological factors have exerted considerable influence. Of these, the very rapid and far-reaching developments in medical technology are of prime importance. These developments operate in different ways. Advances in technology not only give doctors much enhanced and wider powers of intervention and, therefore, of control, they also draw the medical profession away from its former purely therapeutic relationships into a variety of non-therapeutic situations. They also lay the medical profession open to much more scientific scrutiny and criticism. As a result, the profession has lost the protection of most ofthe myths and magic created by an uneducated but grateful public.
Medical negligence This topic is bedevilled by nomenclature. Negligence is a misnomer. No single word has caused more misunderstanding and ill-feeling. It does not, in law, mean 'carelessness' (though carelessness is included in it). It means lack of professional skill causing injury. It would be better to call it 'liability for medical mishaps'.
The most significant aetiological factor here was the introduction of the NHS. Before 1948, the hospitals were mostly charitable organizations though the local authority sector was growing, particularly in London. Consultants gave their services free to the voluntary hospitals as 'honoraries' and the junior staff were paid at a nominal rate. Consultants were not, therefore, employed by the voluntary hospital, which accordingly was not responsible in law for any negligence on their part, though it was liable for the junior medical and nursing staff. It was also an era in which judges and everyone else had great respect for 'medical men', and were profoundly ignorant of medical matters. The result was that the courts discouraged medical negligence actions, feeling that charitable funds (and ratepayers' funds) were not intended to be used for paying damages. So it was very difficult to win such cases unless the negligence was overwhelming. The only cases with a good prognosis were the 'swab' cases where the patient was sent back to the ward with either a swab or even a Spencer Wells in the abdomen, or where a confusion occurred and an operation was performed on the wrong side or the wrong patient! It is not surprising that the annual premium to the Medical Defence Union was under £5! Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 80 December 1987 733
The introduction of the NHS changed all this, though it took some years for the old attitudes to atrophy and be discarded. A new generation of judges was not in such awe of the 'medical man', and the fact that damages would now fall on the taxpayer instead of charity funds relieved the old inhibition. But it still continued to be very difficult to launch, let alone win, a claim for damages for medical negligence. The introduction of legal aid removed the formidable economic deterrent, but the onus of proof was (and still is) on the plaintiff (the patient). This means that he or she must be able to call at least one medical witness to say that the treatment was negligent or unskilful. It is, usually, difficult to find such a witness, though it does not seem to be quite as bad now as it used to be. There was (and still is) in legal circles a widely held belief that the medical profession 'gangs up' to protect a threatened member, and, sometimes, a suspicion that the medical protection societies encourage the reluctance. This caused rising frustration among lawyers, extending to some of the judges. In cases of negligence in other spheres judges can often form an opinion about it without much evidence, but in medical cases, unless 'very obvious', they lack the knowledge or experience to form even a preliminary opinion without medical evidence.
These difficulties in getting medical evidence directed legal minds to finding a way of avoiding them. There have always been situations in which people have been injured in accidents that must have been caused by negligence, yet they are unable to produce witnesses. Many years ago the judges evolved a doctrine called 'res ipsa loquitur' for such situations. The Latin tag means 'the thing speaks for itself. The effect of the doctrine is to move the burden of prooffrom the plaintiffto the defendant to disprove negligence.
It was first developed in a case where a sack or a barrel fell out of a warehouse loading-bay on to the plaintiff in the street below. Sacks or barrels do not move spontaneously, so the mere fact of the fall raises a presumption that some human agency moved it, and probably was negligent. It eventually proved impossible to resist the temptation to apply this doctrine to medical cases. The results soon proved disastrous. The law of gravity is reasonably predictable in its effects, but the behaviour of living organisms is quite another thing. So, defendants sometimes found themselves in the greatest difficulties in explaininghow the mishapto the patienthad occurred and exculpating themselves from negligence. There was a period in the 1950s, in fact, when it was very difficult to win a case for a doctor or hospital.
Fortunately, after a fairly short time, the courts realised that this had gone too far and there was a swing back", In 1957, Mr Justice McNair re-asserted the principle that it was a good defence 'if [the doctor] exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art'. He also directed the jury that a doctor is not guilty of negligence ifhe acts 'in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art'. The case was Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee 7 • This ruling has been specifically approved by the House of Lords", and is now known as the 'Bolam principle'. A fact of possible aetiological interest is that two of Mr Justice McNair's siblings were well-known medical consultants, so his awareness of the practical problems facing doctors was enhanced.
But the war of attrition goes on, and between 1980 and 1985 three determined attempts? were made to get round the Bolam principle by trying to find a way of recovering damages without proving negligence. One was to try to use the old law of 'battery' (or 'assault' or 'trespass', the terms are interchangeable for this purpose). It had been generally assumed that in English law any kind of physical interference with another person's body is a 'battery' which can give rise to a claim for damages, unless the person has 'consented' to it. (Hence the consent form.) This broad statement has appeared in textbooks for many years but, so far as I know, it has never been applied in practice and no patient has recovered damages for trespass in these circumstances, i.e. where the doctor has been acting in a therapeutic capacity. The judges have always rejected this argument on the basis that the patient had given formal consent to be treated or operated on, or such consent was to be implied (e.g. the unconscious patient in emergency).
However, quite recently lawyers came to hear of the phrase 'informed consent', now so common in articles in medical journals, and decided to use it to renew the attempt to sue doctors for 'battery', arguing that nothing less than 'informed consent' would provide a defence. Again, these attempts were rebuffed. You may be surprised to hear that the judges stated that 'informed consent' was not a legal concept at all. Once consent has been given, the law does not permit (certainly in this context) any enquiry into the state of knowledge of the person consenting. Apparent consent can only be displaced by proofof fraud or duress. ( In Sidaway's case it was accepted that a doctor had a duty to give the patient adequate information and to answer questions frankly. However, the House of Lords was divided as to how adequacy was to be measured. The majority held that the Bolam principle applied; so, if the evidence established that other skilled and responsible practitioners would have acted in the same way as the defendant doctor had done, there would be no breach of duty. The minority held that the court must ultimately be the judge of the adequacy of the information (or warning) in fact given.
This division of opinion is more emotive than real, because no judge could reach such a decision (except in an obvious Case where the issue would not arise) without a considerable amount of medical evidence, explaining the medical problems involved and the probable effects on the patient of giving or withholding information at the relevant time. If there were a conflict of medical evidence. it would be a bold judge who took it upon himself in real life to choose between the experts. though he might assert, in theory, his freedom to do so I O.
1must now turn to some ofthe non-therapeutic applications of medical knowledge and skills, which depend upon developments in medical technology, to various social and legal purposes. Two of these impinge directly on the work of judges and magistrates in court: they are blood groups and blood alcohol measurements. Both are now fully accepted in the courts and make great contributions to the interests of justice, but it was not always so. It has been a long struggle.
Blood groups
Paternity cases were so difficult that judges, centuries ago, had to construct presumptions for themselves. One was that a child born to a married woman was presumed to be her husband's child unless it could be proved beyond doubt that he could not have been near her at the relevant time. To reinforce the presumption, he was not permitted to give evidence himself, but had to prove his absence by other witnesses. The relevant time was pretty elastic to ensure against bastardizing a child unjustly. This led to some surprisingly long periods of gestation during the last war! In one case, about 350 days elapsed between the husband's return to his unit and the birth of the baby, but illegitimacy was not found proved. In fairness to wives, babies and the courts, some husbands did manage to slip home for a short time without their units having a record of absence! On the other hand, the pervasive male belief that every man is a sitting target for a designing woman led to the rule that an unmarried mother's evidence that 'X' was the father of her child could not be acted upon unless it was corroborated by other independent evidence.
It is a remarkable fact, which reflects no credit on the legislature or the judiciary, that ever since Landsteiner described the ABO blood group system, and the simple rules of inheritance were worked out early this century, there was available a technique, admittedly at first primitive, which would have been much better and fairer than this collection of presumptions and exclusionary rules, but was not permitted to be used unless all the persons concerned consented. The courts could not insist upon a party giving a blood sample because to take blood without consent would be a battery and, since no one can be compelled to incriminate himself, no adverse inference could be drawn from a refusal to provide a sample. In the case of children it was said that it could not be in the interests of the child to be subjected to such invasive methods as a needle prick, and, besides, the result of a blood test might be to bastardize him or her! For years attempts were made, notably by Lord Merthyr, by Private Members' BillS to induce Parliament to give the courts the necessary powers. Meanwhile, techniques of serology became increasingly sophisticated by the discovery of more and more inherited factors until the point was reached when something like 90% discrimination became possible.
Then attitudes began to change. In 1968 the Court of Appeal decided that the court could properly order a child to be blood grouped if the interests of justice demanded it l l , and in the following year Parliament passed the Family Law Reform Act which gave the courts power to order blood groups to be ascertained and laid down a practical procedure. The old problem of overriding a refusal to provide a blood sample was neatly evaded by giving the court power to draw any inference from a refusal which it thought right (e.g. that the sample would reveal the truth).
The long struggle was over and the long drawn-out paternity suits have disappeared almost completely.
Blood alcohol
The blood alcohol story ran a rather different course. By the 1960s the techniques for measuring alcohol levels in breath, blood or urine were firmly established, and much research had been done on the effects of quite low concentrations of alcohol in the blood on performance of various kinds. The aetiological role of alcohol in road accidents was becoming clearer and clearer. At the same time the crudity of the judicial process for trying persons accused of drunken driving was becoming more and more apparent. Such cases often took days to try, involving controverted evidence about driving skills, or a lack ofthem, smell of the breath, very dubious neurological evidence, mainly about ataxia (walking along a chalk line), pupil changes, dysarthria (very crude tests in the police station) and always Romberg's sign.
At last, in 1967, Mrs Barbara Castle as Minister of Transport seized the nettle and persuaded Parliament to pass the Road Traffic Act, which authorized the use of the breathalyser and made it a serious offence to drive with a blood alcohol over 80 mg/rnl, It is of some aetiological significance that this step was taken by a woman; it is doubtful whether at that time a male minister would have been prepared to face the uproar. The ability to 'hold your drink' is deeply embedded in male fantasy, but, I believe, completely absent in the female! Nevertheless, to persuade Parliament to authorize such a radical departure from the rules of the game, required the inclusion of the most stringent precautions in the rules to protect, not those at risk, but the drinking driver from possible injustice. This produced some very unfortunate results but it accorded with a very wide segment of opinion. Most of the older judges and most male magistrates were out of sympathy with Mrs Castle's policy. They were sceptical about science generally, and, though highly literate, were not particularly numerate. So concepts like mg per ml and concentrations in any form did not convey any clear-cut idea to their minds. Further, the whole procedure seemed to mean that the conviction took place, not in court, but in the forensic science laboratory, by a faceless technician who might have got the wrong blood sample anyway. Nor did judges and magistrates really believe that relatively small concentrations of alcohol could seriously affect their own or anyone else's driving. Add to this the difficulty of converting blood alcohol levels into corresponding numbers of pints, whiskeys or glasses, and it is easy to understand the reluctance to convict and the sympathy with which any purely technical defence was received. The real trouble, of course, was that for lawyers used to the old methods, it was extremely frustrating to have to contend with laboratory reports that left no room for manoeuvre! One cannot argue with measurement.
Happily, the progress of technology has come to the rescue. The invention ofthe Lion Intoximeter has Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 80 December 1987 735 made it possible to measure blood alcohol directly from the breath and, with a computer technique, to obtain an immediate printout. This made it necessary to amend Mrs Castle's law and provide a welcome opportunity to get rid of most of the unmeritorious technical defences'", Happily also, the passage of time has convinced nearly everyone of the truth that drinking and driving is a very dangerous combination, and has brought to the Bench a generation of judges who are much less receptive to ingenious but spurious technical defences, and more familiar with scientific measurements. In fact, the wheel has come full circle. The reading of the Lion Intoximeter 3000 giving the alcohol concentration in the breath cannot be challenged by evidence tending to show that it must be inaccurate. The driver's only remedy is to ask for a blood or urine sample to be analysed 13.
Abortion
Abortion became a criminal offence and a serious one in this country and in the United States in the 19th century. It does not even appear in the index to Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England published in the 1770s. Originally this law was aimed at the 'back street abortionist', whose crude techniques and abortifacient drugs were highly dangerous to the woman's life or health. At this stage doctors did not 'do abortions', or 'procure miscarriages'; they 'terminated pregnancies' when they considered it necessary. So, the law always recognized that it was not unlawful to terminate pregnancy to save the mother's life if it was done under acceptable conditions. The subsequent development of the law is closely connected with technological developments which have progressively reduced the risk to the mother and simplified the operation. So abortion became justifiable to avoid risk ofserious danger to the mother's physical health and then to her future mental health, always assuming that the operation was performed by a doctor.
By 1967, the position had been reached where large numbers of abortions were being performed by doctors who were professional abortionists, mostly without legal justification, and without interference by the police because the difficulty of proving that there was no real risk to the mother's health was so great. In that year, David Steel MP introduced a private members' Bill, which became the Abortion Act 1967, which greatly widened the scope of legal abortion, provided it is done by a qualified medical practitioner, after approval by another doctor, and in an approved establishment and with proper records being kept.
The result has been to make abortion virtually available on demand, up to 28 weeks' gestation. This is because it is impossible in practice to control such flexible rules, if the statutory formalities are complied with. However, this situation would not have been tolerated had not the techniques made the process simpler and safer.
The penultimate stage is the post-coital pill, which requires no intervention by the medical profession, and the ultimate stage will be a 'do-it-yourself' technique.
In the United States the aetiology was quite different. Each State had its own abortion law, all more or less restrictive, in the traditional way, until, in 1971, two cases!" reached the Supreme Court in each of which a woman, supported by some of the women's organizations, challenged the constitutional validity of the abortion law in Texas and Georgia respectively, on the grounds that these laws infringed the constitutional rights of women to privacy and to control over their own bodies'S. The Supreme Court, by a majority of 7 to 2, accepted this submission and 'struck down' the Texas and Georgia laws and with them the abortion laws in all the other States! However, the Court was faced with the dilemma of the rights, if any, of the fetus. It therefore evolved a formula which laid down the limits within which the States could legally legislate for the control of abortion. These are:
(1) During the first trimester, abortion cannot be restricted and depends on the mutual consent of doctor and patient. (2) During the second trimester, the State may regulate abortion only to protect the woman's health. (3) During the third trimester, i.e. after 24 weeks, the State may act to protect the potential life of the fetus.
This remarkable judgment was written by Mr Justice Blackmun after prolonged study of all aspects of the problem, much of it in the library at the Mayo Clinic to which he had been legal adviser for many years before being made a judge. One of the other justices (Mr Justice Powell) also had close family connections with the medical profession. As in Bolam's case", these connections may have had interesting aetiological effects.
Contraception
The medical profession has become involved in contraception more or less by accident. The pharmacology of the 'pill' led to its being available only on a doctor's prescription. Female anatomy also involved doctors to some extent in fitting appliances. But this caused no legal problems until Mrs Gillick appeared on the scene", In 1981,as part of an anti-contraception campaign, she concentrated on the Memorandum of Guidance issued by the DHSS to doctors and other staff working in NHS family planning clinics and, in particular, on that part of it which said that in exceptional cases doctors could give contraceptive advice and treatment to girls under 16 years of age, without parental consent or knowledge, and that such girls were entitled to full confidentiality.
She began by asking for an assurance from her Area Health Authority that in no circumstances would contraceptive advice or treatment be given to any of her daughters (then all under 16). This assurance the Area Health Authority could not give. Mrs Gillick then started an action against the Area Health Authority and the DHSS asking the court to declare that the advice in the Memorandum was 'unlawful', in other words, that a doctor giving such advice or treatment would be acting illegally.
This caused a legal furore which split the judges down the middle. Mr Justice Woolf, at first instance, dismissed Mrs Gillick's claim and upheld the DHSS's Memorandum of Guidance; a unanimous Court of Appeal of three judges reversed his decision and declared that the advice was unlawful; and, finally, the House of Lords by a majority of 3 to 2 reversed the Court of Appeal and restored Mr Justice WooIrs original judgment, holding that it was not unlawful for a doctor, in exceptional circumstances, to give contraceptive advice or treatment to a girl under 16, without the knowledge and consent of her parents, or parent substitute. Mrs Gillick thus had in her favour a numerical majority overall of 5 to 4 but lost in the final court by 3 
to 2.
It is safe to say that this conflict would not have happened had an individual doctor been sued or prosecuted, because it would have been impossible to show that he had done anything illegal. But the form of the question which was raised in this action was purely hypothetical, and hypothetical questions are notorious for producing judicial conflicts. In fact, the courts nearly always refuse to adjudicate on hypothetical cases, and, in retrospect, it might have been wiser to have declined to entertain Mrs Gillick's action which, for a time, caused a great perturbation in family planning circles. Moreover, the form of the proceedings, an action for a declaration against the Area Health Authority and the DHSS, led to an issue of great importance to doctors and girls under 16 being decided without either group being represented in court (though counsel for the DHSS did his best to put their points of view).
Three arguments were put forward in support of Mrs Gillick's case that it was illegal to give such advice or treatment to a girl under 16, without her parents' consent. First, it was said that a girl under 16 is incapable in law of giving a valid consent to contraceptive advice or treatment or indeed to any other form of medical treatment. The majority in the House of Lords rejected this argument, because there is no general rule oflaw that a person under 16cannot give a valid consent to medical treatment. Such a rule would be contrary to common sense. There was no special rule relating to contraception. This, in effect, disposes of the mythical 'age of consent' so often referred to. All that is left of it is the minimum age for marriage, and the provision in Section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956that it is an offence to have sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, whether she consents or not.
Lord Brandon, extrapolating from this, took the extreme view that Parliament must have intended that it should be unlawful to give contraceptive advice or treatment in any circumstances to a girl under 16, even with parental consent. If this were right it would be unlawful to allow a girl under 16 (but not a boy) to obtain a condom out of a slot machine! Lord Templeman and Lord Justice Parker thought the girl incapable of consenting but that her parent could authorize it.
Second, it was asserted that giving such advice or treatment to a girl under 16 without the knowledge and consent of a parent infringes the rights of the parent and is therefore unlawful. Again the majority in the House of Lords rejected this contention on the ground that 'parental rights' have never been defined, but whatever they may be they exist for the benefit of the child and not of the parents. In any event, they agreed with Lord Denning in that, where teenagers are concerned, the right to control is a 'dwindling right' with increasing age, and one which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child. He added that parental rights start with a right to control and end with 'little more than advice'. Lord Templeman and the Court of Appeal agreed emphatically with Mrs Gillick that the doctors would be infringing her rights as a parent.
The third contention was that the doctor who prescribed contraceptives to a girl under 16 was guilty of aiding, abetting and encouraging a criminal offence, i.e. under Section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. This broke down at an early stage because the girl herself commits no criminal offence and in any event the doctor does not intend to encourage her but to reduce the risk she runs.
The contrast between the judgments for and against Mrs Gillick is most striking. There is an unmistakable emotional tension in those holding that the DHSS's advice was unlawful which is quite absent from the majority judgments which are severely practical and down-to-earth. Aetiologically, it is worthy of note that the three Law Lords in the majority were the oldest of the 9 judges and that none of them had had a daughter. Perhaps they had been spared some of the frustrations of parenthood, especially ofteenage girls!
Conclusion
I have tried to demonstrate that the law is not a rigid structure but is sufficiently fluid to adapt to changing social conditions. At the same time, its viscosity must be high enough to retain its shape.
